Issues & Studies - Canberra conference
Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia and Britain recently held a conference at Canberra to discuss defensive problems concerning Singapore and Malaysia after British withdrawal of forces east of the Suez Canal in 1971. The meeting was attended by Denis Healey, British minister of national defense; Tun Abdul Razak, Malaysian deputy prime minister; Lee Kuan-yew, prime minister of Singapore; Keith Holyoake, prime minister of New Zealand; and Gordon Freeth, Australian foreign minister.
This was the second meeting of its kind. The first was held at Kuala Lumpur in June, 1968.
Great Britain has been on the decline since World War II. The economic crisis is worsening. The British government first decided to withdraw troops stationed in areas east of Suez around 1975. The date was advanced because of increasing financial difficulties.
The military withdrawal program involves an area from Aden to Hongkong. Singapore and Malaysia were British colonies and the British have been responsible for their defense. The two countries also depend on British military spending as an important financial resource.
Although Australia and New Zealand have increased their military forces, strength is inadequate to cope with every contingency. After World War II, the two countries signed mutual defense treaties with the United States. British military withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia poses a serious security problem for Australia and New Zealand.
Australian military aid to Singapore and Malaysia was originally symbolic. In 1955, Australia sent an infantry battalion, an artillery battery and some auxiliary troops. Australian forces now in Singapore and Malaysia include a battalion and light anti-aircraft artillery units, 42 fighter and transport planes, a destroyer, a corvette and an aircraft carrier that is on patrol for three months each year. Some 2,500 men are involved.
The Australian government originally agreed to British withdrawal around 1975. Australia sent a military mission to Singapore and Malaysia in May, 1967, and announced allocation or military aid totaling 20 million Australian pounds in 1970.
Last January Britain informed Australia of its plan for earlier withdrawal. The Australian government protested on the ground that this would endanger peace and security in Southeast Asia.
The present Australian armed forces total some 820,000 men, including 430,000 in the army, 170,000 in the navy and 220,000 in the air force. The military strength of New Zealand is less than half that of Australia. Although the two countries realize their security is closely related to that of Singapore and Malaysia, they cannot provide adequate support.
After long consideration, Australia and New Zealand decided that their forces would remain in Singapore and Malaysia indefinitely after British withdrawal in 1971 two battalions will be composed of 1,200 Australians and 250 New Zealanders. An Australian and a New Zealand ship will be on station. Air force strength will remain unchanged-34 aircraft in Malaysia and 8 in Singapore.
Australian and New Zealand prime ministers advanced these conditions: (1) Australian and New Zealand troops will be in Singapore and Malaysia at the request of the two countries and under the existing British-Malaysian defense treaty; no new treaty will be signed. (2) Australian and New Zealand troops may be used to cope with Communist aggression but will not become involved in maintenance of internal security.
The joint communique of the Canberra conference made these points: (1) The five-nation conference is pleased to note the substantial progress of Singapore and Malaysia in increasing their defensive capability. (2) Australia and New Zealand are welcome to keep their forces in the Singapore and Malaysia area. (3) The governments of the five countries will continue close consultations on the Southeast Asian situation and its effect on Singapore and Malaysia and will develop harmonious relations with other Southeast Asian countries based on principles of peaceful development and regional cooperation. (4) The conference decided to conduct a large-scale combined exercise in 1970 to test British mobility in assisting Singapore and Malaysia. (5) The third conference will be convened after the exercise.
Australia is concerned about the limited defensive capabilities of Singapore and Malaysia and is helping develop a Southeast Asian collective security system. It has also made clear that armed forces of allies outside the region may be requested if Australian and New Zealand forces in Singapore and Malaysia are inadequate to cope with an aggressor.- Meng Hsiang
Issues & Studies - Moscow conference
The World Communist Conference opened in Moscow June 5 with representatives and observers from 75 Communist parties attending. As listed in the communique of the first session, these parties included some of those not included in the usual Soviet count of 88. Rather, they constituted a gathering from among the 99 Communist parties known to the free world. If Peiping-sponsored splinter groups are included, the total of Communist parties must be over 120.
It has been five years since Nikita Khrushchev first made the decision to call a World Communist Conference. In February and March, 1968, a consultative meeting in Budapest resolved to set up a preparatory committee in spite of divergent views on a program, an international center of the Communist movement and condemnation of the Mao regime. The inaugural meeting of the preparatory committee was held in April, 1968. It was decided to open the World Communist Conference on November 25 and limit the agenda to "the question of anti-imperialist tasks in the present stage and the united actions of Communist and workers' parties and all anti-imperialist forces". But the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the five Warsaw Pact nations angered many Communist parties and the conference was postponed. The agenda was changed to include plans for the celebration of Lenin's centennial.
The Soviet Communist Party had these four conference objectives: (1) intensification of the struggle against Peiping, (2) tightening of international Communist unity to strengthen Soviet leadership, (3) exercise of greater control over the Communist bloc of nations and (4) a more vigorous Communist confrontation of the free world.
The CPSU tried to circumvent the restrictive conference agenda in order to pursue its own objectives. The conference document drafted by the Soviets had four chapters: (1) analysis of the international situation, (2) anti-imperialist tasks and united actions, (3) relations among Communist parties and (4) relations among Communist and workers' parties and other "progressive" forces. Such statements as "the existence of the socialist camp constitutes part of the world class struggle" and "the defense of socialism is an international Communist obligation" were a veiled attempt to justify Brezhnev's "limited sovereignty" theory. The warning against "splitting the united front of socialist nations in the anti-imperialist struggle" sounds like an indirect impeachment of Peiping. Another clause said: "A Communist nation must behave in such a way as to be responsible not only to its own working class and people but also to the international working class. A Marxist-Leninist is not only a patriot but also an internationalist." These words sound like an indirect criticism of Romania.
At the last preparatory committee meeting in May, most participants voiced objection to the draft document; others called for amendment. The Romanians, British, Australians, Swiss and Belgians took strong exception to the document. The Italians condemned it as imposing unity at the expense of the essential differences of individual parties. Most parties of Western Europe, angered by Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, were indignant. Some demanded scrapping of the whole draft except the second chapter. No agreement had been reached when the meeting was adjourned May 30.
An unwritten agreement had been made not to mention the touchy Peiping issue. But no sooner had the conference opened than representatives of the Paraguayan, Polish and French Communist parties took the floor to condemn the Chinese Communist Party. General Secretary Ceausescu, the Romanian Communist leader, voiced his objection and walked out of the meeting in protest.
At the evening session of June 6, the Australian representative denounced the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia as having jeopardized the entire Communist movement. He threatened not to sign the final conference documents unless steps of redress were taken. Pravda was compelled to publish his speech. G. Husak, first secretary of the Czech Communist Party, postponed his speech.
Speaking on behalf of the CPSU the following day, Brezhnev hurled invective at the Chinese Communist leadership. He denounced it for forsaking Marxism-Leninism and internationalism. He castigated the substitution of Mao Tse-tung's thought for Marxism-Leninism in the party constitution adopted by the CCP 9th Congress and branded the CCP as an anti-Soviet militant party dedicated to serving imperialism and promoting "splittism" and "big nation chauvinism".
Then came a flurry of scathing attacks on the Chinese Reds by pro-Soviet delegates. On June 9 Ceausescu again objected to attacks on the CCP but he also demanded that the latter refrain from attacking the CPSU. He stressed the independence of national parties but avoided making any drastic attacks on Brezhnevism.
On June 10, the Italian representative criticized the action of the Kremlin and its followers in Czechoslovakia as harmful to the international Communist movement. He expressed opposition to the draft conference document except for the second chapter on anti-imperialism. He threatened not to sign unless there was a drastic revision. He was critical of the Chinese Communist cultural revolution and its attempt to define Mao's thought as Marxism-Leninism in the contemporary era, but he still demanded compromise with the Chinese Communists through negotiations.
This Italian stand was supported by the Australian, Swiss and Norwegian parties.
After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Peiping intensified its attack on Moscow. The focus of its propaganda was shifted from Soviet "revisionism" to "socialist imperialism." Soviet Russia was condemned as a "new Czar" after the Chenpao Island incident. The Kremlin was accused of seizing the territory and resources of other nations in an attempt to enhance its status at the World Communist Conference. In the meantime, however, the Chinese Feds agreed in mid-May to meet with the Soviets in a navigation conference and issued a statement on May 24 on resumption of the Soviet border talks. But the statement attacked Soviet Russia for "crimes of aggression". Obviously, the Chinese Reds resorted to a propaganda offensive while still following a defensive strategy in an effort to influence the World Communist Conference.
Many Communist parties have criticized Peiping but the more important ones also refused to go along with Moscow. More than 30 parties are challenged by pro-Peiping factions or splinter groups. Among total party members, Moscow holds only a slight edge over Peiping.
The CCP did not invite delegations from other Communist parties to attend its Congress in April. It showed its international strength merely by publishing congratulatory messages from pro-Peiping parties and factional groups. If the outcome of the World Communist Conference was unfavorable to Peiping, the CCP might invite these parties and factional groups to the Peiping regime's celebration of its 20th anniversary October I. The subsequent appearance of a Peiping-centered international Communist movement would be blamed on the Kremlin and the failure of the world Communist summit.
The Soviets cannot expect to subdue the CCP with the World Communist Conference. Nor can they fully realize their hope of becoming the leader of the world's Communist parties despite their plea for unity and solidarity.- Yin Ching-yao
West & East - Russo-American talks
President Nixon said during the campaign that relations between the United States and the Soviet Union should develop from confrontation to negotiations.
There have been several summit conferences between the two countries since World War II. Nikita Khrushchev visited the United States in 1959. However, his conference with President Eisenhower did not yield any concrete result. Eisenhower planned a return visit but gave up the idea as a result of the U-2 incident. President Kennedy's meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna in 1961 eased tensions. President Johnson and Kosygin met at Glassboro, New Jersey, in 1967 and discussed the Middle East war, Vietnam war, nuclear non-proliferation and limitation of anti-ballistic missile installations. No agreements were reached.
Some American-Soviet negotiations on the problems of Vietnam and Middle East have begun and others will be undertaken. If the Vietnam war does not heat up again, Nixon may hold a summit conference with Kosygin in Russia or elsewhere.
In the United States, the heavy tax burden, inflation and student riots are considered phenomena brought about by the Vietnam war. The new administration has given first priority to peaceful solution of the Vietnam problem.
However, there is not much hope. Washington pins its hopes on Moscow. Nixon has said Soviet Russia could lessen the tensions of the war.
But the Russians have steadfastly attempted to use Vietnam to embarrass the United States and force it to pay a bigger price in other negotiations.
With pressure from the appeasers, the United States has begun to withdraw forces from Vietnam. The Peiping-Moscow schism has continued to deteriorate since the border incident at Chengpao Island. Under these circumstances, American-Soviet secret negotiations may make progress. Facing border tensions, Czechoslovak resistance and an increasing national budget, Moscow might urge North Vietnam and the Viet Cong to agree to a temporary peaceful solution of the conflict after obtaining concessions from the United States.
One issue to be negotiated between the United States and Soviet Union is the limitation of ballistic missiles. In recent years, the 18 - nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva has stressed control of nuclear weaponry. The partial ban treaty was signed in 1963 and nuclear non-proliferation treaty (not yet effective) in 1968.
In March, 1969, the United States and Soviet Union made separate proposals to the disarmament conference. They are getting closer on ballistic missile and anti-ballistic missile issues.
Russia has already established an anti-ballistic missile system. In May, 1967, when General Wheeler testified before the Senate Sub-committee on Disarmament, he proposed installation of an American anti-ballistic missile system. President Nixon believes in negotiations backed by power. Despite domestic objections, he has backed such a system.
In Vietnam, the two sides do not want any change favorable to Chinese Communist expansion. However, Moscow has been reluctant to help in reaching a peaceful solution.
In the Middle East, the American and Russian policies have been identical-limitation of Arab-Israeli conflict to avoid involvement. However, the Russians have continued military aid to the UAR, Syria and Algeria and have obtained the right to use Port Said, Alexandria and Latakia.
Future American-Soviet relations will be marked by intermittent confrontation and compromise.- Chen Shao-hsien